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0.	  Introduction	  To	  what	  extent	  are	  the	  answers	  to	  theological	  questions	  knowable?	  And	  if	  the	  relevant	  answers	  are	  knowable,	  which	  sorts	  of	  inquirers	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  them?	  In	  this	  chapter	  we	  shall	  not	  answer	  these	  questions	  directly	  but	  instead	  supply	  a	  range	  of	  tools	  that	  may	  help	  us	  make	  progress	  here.	  The	  tools	  consist	  of	  plausible	  structural	  constraints	  on	  knowledge.	  After	  articulating	  them,	  we	  shall	  go	  on	  to	  indicate	  some	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  interact	  with	  theological	  scepticism.	  In	  some	  cases	  the	  structural	  constraints	  bear	  directly	  on	  whether	  one	  can	  know	  answers	  to	  theological	  questions.	  But	  the	  structural	  considerations	  are	  related	  to	  theological	  scepticism	  in	  other	  interesting	  ways	  as	  well;	  for	  instance	  we	  will	  also	  be	  using	  them	  to	  explore	  the	  significance	  of	  scepticism,	  by	  addressing	  questions	  such	  as	  ‘To	  what	  extent	  does	  it	  matter	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  can	  know	  the	  answer	  to	  theological	  questions?’	  	  In	  section	  1,	  we	  will	  outline	  a	  list	  of	  plausible	  structural	  features	  of	  knowledge.	  Then	  beginning	  in	  section	  2	  we	  discuss	  each	  in	  connection	  with	  some	  and	  contemporary	  debates	  in	  theology.	  This	  is	  merely	  a	  preliminary	  sampling	  of	  the	  range	  of	  issues	  that	  might	  be	  fruitfully	  investigated	  in	  the	  framework	  we	  outline.	  While	  much	  more	  could	  be	  added	  beyond	  what	  we	  say	  here,	  we	  hope	  to	  show	  that	  careful	  thinking	  about	  knowledge	  is	  of	  interest	  to	  familiar	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epistemological	  debates	  in	  theology.	  Some	  of	  these	  results	  are	  friendly	  to	  a	  sceptical	  outlook,	  and	  others	  are	  not.	  	  Our	  focus	  will	  be	  on	  sceptical	  concerns	  about	  knowledge,	  not	  about	  certainty	  or	  justification.	  Those	  who	  think	  that	  knowledge	  is	  to	  be	  illuminated	  via	  the	  concepts	  of	  certainty	  and/or	  justification	  might	  think	  that	  the	  most	  helpful	  way	  into	  scepticism	  is	  via	  one	  or	  both	  of	  those	  concepts.	  While	  we	  are	  not	  sympathetic	  to	  that	  outlook,	  we	  hope	  proponents	  of	  these	  alternative	  frameworks	  would	  nevertheless	  stand	  to	  benefit	  from	  our	  discussion,	  as	  many	  of	  the	  relevant	  structural	  issues	  will	  carry	  over.	  	  	  
1.	  Structural	  connections	  We	  now	  present	  a	  range	  of	  foundational	  structural	  ideas	  about	  knowledge	  that	  we	  find	  somewhat	  plausible.	  1.1	  NO	  ERROR	  IN	  CLOSE	  WORLDS:	  Some	  paradigmatic	  cases	  where	  subjects	  lack	  knowledge	  are	  cases	  where	  they	  could	  easily	  have	  had	  a	  false	  belief.	  For	  instance	  subjects	  in	  typical	  Gettier	  cases	  have	  a	  (justified)	  true	  belief	  that	  is	  not	  knowledge	  owing	  to	  an	  accident	  of	  luck	  that	  renders	  the	  subject’s	  justified	  belief	  true.	  It	  is	  natural	  to	  say	  in	  these	  cases	  that	  things	  could	  easily	  have	  gone	  differently	  so	  as	  to	  result	  in	  a	  false	  belief	  in	  the	  subject,	  and	  that	  the	  subject	  in	  the	  actual	  world	  doesn’t	  know	  for	  this	  reason	  (Cf.	  Gettier	  1963).	  The	  false	  belief	  in	  a	  nearby	  world	  doesn’t	  have	  to	  be	  the	  same	  belief	  as	  in	  the	  actual	  world.	  If	  one	  forms	  mathematical	  beliefs	  about	  large	  sums	  by	  random	  guessing,	  and	  one	  happens	  to	  guess	  the	  sum	  of	  85	  and	  24	  correctly,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  for	  the	  belief	  that	  85	  +	  24	  =	  109	  to	  be	  false	  in	  nearby	  worlds.	  But	  by	  virtue	  of	  arriving	  at	  one’s	  beliefs	  in	  sums	  by	  mere	  guessing,	  one	  will	  form	  similar	  (though	  not	  strictly	  
identical)	  false	  beliefs	  in	  nearby	  worlds.	  It	  is	  plausible	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  risk	  of	  error	  is	  incompatible	  with	  knowing	  the	  relevant	  sums.	  In	  what	  follows,	  we	  will	  call	  beliefs	  in	  actual	  or	  nearby	  counterfactual	  scenarios	  that	  are	  incompatible	  with	  a	  belief’s	  being	  knowledge	  bad	  companions	  for	  that	  belief.	  (Thus,	  in	  our	  terminology,	  when	  in	  a	  nearby	  world	  one	  arrives	  at	  the	  false	  belief	  that	  85	  +	  24	  =	  101	  by	  guessing,	  that	  belief	  is	  a	  bad	  companion	  for	  one’s	  actual	  true	  belief.)	  1.2	  SIMILARITY	  OF	  BELIEF-­‐FORMING	  PROCESSES:	  Not	  just	  any	  nearby	  possibility	  of	  error	  is	  incompatible	  with	  knowledge.	  If	  a	  normally	  reliable	  informant	  told	  Betty	  that	  Jill	  is	  in	  Brazil,	  but	  Betty	  then	  happens	  to	  turn	  her	  head	  at	  the	  very	  moment	  Jill	  walks	  past	  a	  nearby	  window,	  Betty	  knows	  that	  Jill	  is	  not	  in	  Brazil.	  But	  there	  are	  nearby	  worlds	  where	  Betty	  fails	  to	  turn	  her	  head	  at	  that	  precise	  moment,	  and	  so	  continues	  to	  believe	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  testimony	  that	  Jill	  is	  in	  Brazil.	  One	  natural	  diagnosis	  of	  this	  case	  is	  that	  the	  belief-­‐forming	  methods	  are	  too	  dissimilar—Betty’s	  actual	  belief	  is	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perception,	  while	  in	  the	  nearby	  worlds	  where	  she	  holds	  a	  false	  belief,	  it	  is	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  testimony.	  Our	  preferred	  way	  of	  implementing	  this	  diagnosis	  avoids	  the	  need	  to	  fuss	  about	  individuation	  of	  methods,	  and	  so	  doesn’t	  put	  too	  much	  weight	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  Betty’s	  actual	  belief	  can	  be	  described	  as	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  ‘perception’,	  while	  her	  belief	  in	  a	  nearby	  world	  is	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  ‘testimony’.	  Rather	  what	  is	  important	  is	  that	  the	  fine-­‐grained	  token	  causal	  processes	  leading	  up	  to	  Betty’s	  beliefs	  are	  significantly	  dissimilar	  in	  the	  two	  cases.	  (Obviously	  this	  has	  something	  to	  do	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  belief	  is	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perception	  and	  the	  other	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  testimony.	  But	  ultimately	  the	  non-­‐identity	  of	  the	  relevant	  coarse-­‐grained	  methods	  is	  not	  what	  explains	  why	  Betty	  knows.)	  Since	  the	  token	  causal	  processes	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  false	  beliefs	  in	  nearby	  worlds	  are	  
sufficiently	  dissimilar,	  the	  nearby	  false	  belief	  isn’t	  a	  bad	  companion	  for	  Betty’s	  actual	  belief	  that	  Jill	  is	  not	  in	  Brazil.	  On	  this	  view,	  two	  beliefs	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  broadly	  perceptual	  faculties	  might	  count	  as	  sufficiently	  dissimilar	  since	  the	  fine-­‐grained	  causal	  processes	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  beliefs	  needn’t	  resemble	  each	  other	  to	  a	  high	  degree	  (see	  discussion	  of	  a	  similar	  principle	  in	  Williamson	  2001).	  1.3	  CLOSURE	  and	  COUNTER-­‐CLOSURE:	  Deduction	  is	  a	  means	  to	  extending	  one’s	  knowledge.	  This	  is	  encoded	  in	  a	  familiar	  ‘closure’-­‐style	  principle	  which	  in	  refined	  form	  is	  as	  follows:	  	  CLOSURE:	  If	  one	  knows	  p	  and	  knows	  that	  p	  entails	  q,	  then	  if	  one	  deduces	  q	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  p	  while	  retaining	  knowledge	  throughout,	  then	  one	  knows	  
q.	  (See	  Hawthorne	  2004:	  34)	  As	  a	  companion	  to	  CLOSURE	  we	  might	  naturally	  accept	  a	  ‘counter-­‐closure’	  principle	  which	  claims	  that	  deduction	  does	  not	  produce	  knowledge	  from	  unknown	  premises:	  COUNTER-­‐CLOSURE:	  If	  one	  doesn’t	  know	  p	  then	  if	  one	  deduces	  q	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  p	  while	  lacking	  knowledge	  of	  p	  throughout,	  then	  one	  doesn’t	  know	  q.	  1.4	  KNOWLEDGE-­‐ENTAILING	  STATES:	  Timothy	  Williamson,	  Peter	  Unger	  and	  others	  have	  pointed	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  propositional	  attitudes	  whose	  presence	  seems	  to	  entail	  the	  presence	  of	  knowledge	  (see	  Williamson	  2001	  and	  Unger	  1979).	  For	  example,	  one	  can	  see	  that	  there	  is	  a	  bird	  on	  the	  sill	  only	  if	  one	  knows	  that	  there	  is	  a	  bird	  on	  the	  sill.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  that	  true	  justified	  belief	  formed	  via	  vision	  is	  not	  enough	  -­‐-­‐	  if	  one	  sees	  what	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  cleverly	  fashioned	  plastic	  bird	  on	  the	  sill,	  justifiably	  believes	  that	  there	  is	  a	  bird	  on	  the	  sill,	  but	  there	  is	  a	  bird	  elsewhere	  on	  the	  sill	  one	  does	  not	  notice,	  then	  one	  does	  not	  see	  that	  there	  is	  a	  bird	  on	  the	  sill.	  	  Plausible	  candidates	  for	  knowledge	  entailing	  attitudes	  include	  not	  only	  seeing	  
that	  p,	  but	  also	  remembering	  that	  p,	  regretting	  that	  p	  (though	  obviously	  not	  feeling	  regret	  at	  the	  thought	  that	  p),	  rejoicing	  that	  p	  and	  many	  others.	  	  	   The	  presence	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  reason	  action	  also	  seems	  to	  entail	  the	  presence	  of	  knowledge.	  Here	  we	  have	  in	  mind	  paradigmatic	  uses	  of	  the	  possessive	  reason	  construction	  to	  explain	  a	  person’s	  actions.	  For	  example:	  Jim’s	  reason	  for	  racing	  towards	  the	  sill	  was	  that	  there	  was	  a	  bird	  on	  the	  sill.	  In	  the	  plastic	  bird	  version	  of	  the	  case,	  this	  would	  be	  false	  even	  if	  the	  belief	  that	  there	  was	  a	  bird	  on	  the	  sill	  induced	  racing.	  As	  a	  number	  of	  authors	  have	  noticed,	  it	  seems	  that	  it	  takes	  knowledge	  to	  make	  a	  fact	  available	  as	  a	  ‘personal’/’motivating’	  reason	  (see	  Hyman	  1999	  and	  Hawthorne	  and	  Magidor	  MS).	  1.5	  IGNORANCE-­‐ENTAILING	  STATES:	  The	  literature	  on	  knowledge	  also	  contains	  a	  large	  range	  of	  suggestions	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  certain	  states	  are	  incompatible	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  knowledge.	  We	  shall	  not	  pursue	  some	  of	  the	  more	  tendentious	  suggestions	  that	  have	  been	  made	  in	  this	  connection,	  which	  include	  ‘uncertainty’,	  ‘opinion’,	  ‘doubt’.	  In	  what	  follows	  we	  focus	  on	  a	  suggestion	  that	  is	  not	  merely	  plausible	  but	  which	  has	  particular	  interest	  in	  a	  theological	  setting.	  We	  have	  in	  mind	  the	  state	  of	  risking	  that	  p	  (typically	  expressed	  in	  English	  by	  constructions	  of	  the	  form	  ‘In	  phi-­‐ing	  x	  risked	  that	  x	  would	  F’),	  as	  in:	  ‘when	  breaking	  into	  the	  building,	  the	  burglar	  risked	  that	  he	  would	  be	  videotaped’,	  or	  ‘the	  investor	  risked	  that	  he	  would	  lose	  his	  life	  savings’.	  It	  seems	  clear	  that	  if	  the	  burglar	  knew	  that	  he	  wouldn’t	  be	  videotaped,	  he	  didn’t	  risk	  that	  he	  would	  and	  that	  if	  the	  investor	  knew	  that	  the	  stock	  would	  go	  up,	  he	  didn’t	  risk	  that	  he	  would	  lose	  his	  life	  savings.	  Assuming	  this	  connection	  between	  risk	  and	  absence	  of	  knowledge,	  any	  state	  or	  activity	  that	  requires	  risk	  will	  in	  turn	  preclude	  knowledge.	  	  
1.6	  NORMATIVE	  CONNECTIONS:	  We	  have	  gestured	  at	  entailment	  connections	  between	  knowledge	  and	  the	  presence	  and	  absence	  of	  other	  states.	  Arguably	  there	  are	  also	  interesting	  normative	  connections	  between	  knowledge	  and	  certain	  states	  such	  that	  even	  though	  there	  are	  no	  entailment	  connections,	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  knowledge	  instead	  has	  constitutive	  bearing	  on	  whether	  one	  ought	  to	  be	  in	  those	  states.	  	  One	  plausible	  norm	  of	  this	  sort	  has	  been	  much	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature	  connects	  knowledge	  and	  assertion:	  One	  ought	  to	  assert	  p	  only	  if	  one	  knows	  that	  
p.	  (And	  insofar	  as	  we	  are	  attracted	  to	  this	  norm,	  we	  might	  also	  consider	  extending	  it	  to	  ‘inner	  assertions’,	  states	  of	  judging	  and/or	  believing.)	  But	  in	  what	  follows	  we	  shall	  be	  especially	  concerned	  with	  a	  few	  plausible	  norms	  connecting	  knowledge	  and	  action.	  Let	  us	  begin	  with	  a	  norm	  articulated	  by	  Saul	  Kripke	  in	  his	  ‘Two	  Paradoxes	  of	  Knowledge’	  (Kripke	  2011:	  43):	  KRIPKE:	  If	  A	  knows	  that	  taking	  an	  action	  (i.e.,	  any	  action)	  of	  type	  T	  leads	  to	  consequence	  C,	  and	  A	  wishes	  above	  all	  else	  to	  avoid	  C	  (i.e.,	  this	  is	  the	  only	  relevant	  issue),	  then	  A	  should	  resolve	  now	  not	  to	  take	  any	  action	  of	  type	  T.	  	  (Kripke	  acknowledges	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  state	  the	  norm	  in	  a	  fully	  rigorous	  way	  but	  nevertheless	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  he	  finds	  something	  along	  these	  lines	  attractive.)	  The	  principle	  certain	  does	  seem	  attractive.	  If	  a	  submarine	  commander	  knows	  that	  a	  certain	  military	  action	  will	  lead	  to	  nuclear	  war	  and	  wishes	  above	  all	  else	  to	  avoid	  nuclear	  war	  then	  it	  certainly	  seems	  that	  the	  commander	  ought	  to	  resolve	  not	  to	  undertake	  that	  action.	  And	  insofar	  as	  one	  finds	  this	  principle	  compelling	  there	  is	  a	  companion	  principle	  that	  seems	  prima	  facie	  compelling	  as	  well:	  
COMPANION	  KRIPKE:	  If	  A	  knows	  that	  taking	  any	  action	  of	  type	  T	  leads	  to	  consequence	  C	  and	  doesn’t	  know	  of	  any	  action	  that	  is	  not	  of	  type	  T	  that	  it	  leads	  to	  consequence	  C,	  and	  A	  wishes	  above	  all	  else	  to	  secure	  C	  then	  A	  should	  resolve	  to	  perform	  an	  action	  of	  type	  T.	  If	  one	  wants	  to	  conquer	  the	  enemy	  above	  all	  else	  and	  there	  is	  only	  one	  action	  that	  one	  knows	  of	  to	  do	  it,	  then	  it	  seems	  one	  ought	  to	  do	  that.	  (Again	  this	  is	  not	  fully	  satisfactory.	  For	  one	  thing,	  arguably	  both	  principles	  need	  some	  qualifications	  connected	  to	  what	  one	  is	  able	  to	  do.	  If	  one	  knows	  one	  can’t	  but	  do	  any	  action	  of	  type	  T,	  then	  perhaps	  one	  shouldn’t	  resolve	  to	  avoid	  T-­‐actions	  even	  if	  one	  knows	  that	  doing	  T-­‐actions	  have	  bad	  consequences.	  And	  if	  one	  knows	  that	  actions	  of	  type	  T	  have	  great	  consequences	  but	  is	  unable	  to	  do	  any	  of	  T-­‐type	  actions	  then	  again	  perhaps	  one	  shouldn’t	  resolve	  to	  perform	  any	  of	  them.	  And	  we	  shall	  later	  suggest	  other	  directions	  for	  refinement.	  We	  should	  also	  note	  in	  connection	  with	  these	  principles	  that	  they	  are	  only	  attractive	  when	  the	  ‘ought’	  in	  play	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  subjective	  ‘ought’	  since	  it	  turns	  on	  a	  subject’s	  preferences	  and	  knowledge.)	  	  	  With	  these	  structural	  features	  in	  hand,	  we	  can	  turn	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  special	  issues	  that	  arise	  in	  the	  theological	  domain.	  	  
2.	  CLOSE	  WORLDS:	  Sensitivity	  arguments	  	   One	  common	  argument	  against	  the	  possibility	  of	  knowledge	  begins	  from	  the	  observation	  many	  people	  arrive	  at	  their	  theological	  beliefs	  via	  a	  causal	  process	  that	  is	  insensitive	  to	  the	  truth	  of	  these	  beliefs.	  The	  origins	  of	  many	  theological	  beliefs	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  environmental	  and	  cultural	  factors—in	  a	  
simple	  case,	  it	  might	  be	  that	  the	  beliefs	  of	  one’s	  parents	  and	  immediate	  community,	  plus	  a	  disposition	  to	  believe	  what	  one	  is	  taught,	  are	  sufficient	  to	  cause	  belief	  in	  a	  certain	  set	  of	  theological	  propositions.	  Assuming	  someone’s	  theological	  beliefs	  were	  so	  caused,	  would	  it	  follow	  that	  the	  beliefs	  were	  not	  knowledge?	  One	  way	  of	  completing	  the	  argument	  for	  this	  conclusion	  is	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  people	  who	  arrive	  at	  their	  beliefs	  in	  this	  way	  would	  have	  those	  beliefs	  even	  if	  they	  were	  false.	  The	  belief-­‐formation	  process	  is,	  in	  other	  words,	  insensitive	  to	  the	  truth	  of	  these	  beliefs	  (see	  Nozick	  1981).	  Here	  is	  the	  argument	  form:	  
From	  Insensitivity	  to	  Scepticism:	  1	  X	  believes	  p	  2	  X	  would	  believe	  p	  even	  if	  p	  were	  false	  Therefore	  X	  does	  not	  know	  p	  (We	  should	  note	  in	  passing	  that	  arguments	  of	  this	  sort	  are	  particularly	  problematic	  for	  necessary	  truths,	  especially	  on	  the	  view	  that	  counterfactuals	  with	  necessarily	  false	  antecedents	  are	  vacuously	  true.	  Still,	  there	  are	  many	  theological	  propositions	  that	  are	  continent	  by	  pretty	  much	  anyone’s	  lights.	  It	  would	  be	  a	  significant	  skeptical	  result	  if	  many	  of	  those	  could	  be	  shown	  to	  be	  unknown	  by	  something	  like	  the	  insensitivity	  argument.	  Moreover	  proponents	  of	  arguments	  like	  this	  tend	  to	  refine	  them	  a	  little	  to	  take	  account	  of	  the	  structural	  observations	  of	  SIMILARITY.	  	  Perhaps	  premise	  2	  should	  read:	  X	  would	  believe	  p	  
using	  a	  relevantly	  similar	  method	  even	  if	  p	  were	  false.	  What	  we	  say	  below	  can	  be	  adapted	  to	  these	  refinements.)	  It	  is	  widely	  acknowledged	  that	  arguments	  of	  the	  form	  of	  From	  Insensitivity	  
to	  Scepticism	  are	  pretty	  shaky.	  Many	  beliefs	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  perceptual	  
experience—for	  instance,	  that	  it	  is	  the	  product	  of	  an	  external	  world	  rather	  than	  hallucination—similarly	  fail	  to	  be	  sensitive.	  After	  all,	  were	  our	  perceptual	  experience	  to	  be	  the	  product	  of	  hallucination,	  we	  would	  still	  believe	  that	  it	  wasn’t.	  But	  unless	  we	  wish	  to	  go	  in	  for	  a	  quite	  far-­‐reaching	  scepticism,	  we	  should	  not	  take	  this	  insensitivity	  to	  indicate	  a	  failure	  to	  know	  that	  our	  experience	  is	  the	  product	  of	  external	  objects—the	  false	  beliefs	  about	  our	  experience	  in	  hallucination	  worlds	  are	  not,	  in	  our	  phraseology,	  bad	  companions	  for	  our	  actual	  beliefs	  about	  the	  external	  world.	  In	  sum,	  the	  claim	  that	  theological	  claims	  cannot	  be	  known	  because	  they	  are	  insensitive	  carries	  consequences	  that	  those	  of	  us	  inclined	  to	  reject	  scepticism	  in	  other	  domains	  will	  reject	  (see	  for	  example	  Sosa	  1999	  for	  more	  discussion	  of	  sensitivity	  principles).	  	   Plausibly	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  possibility	  where	  one	  falsely	  believes	  that	  one’s	  perceptual	  experience	  is	  the	  product	  of	  an	  external	  world	  rather	  than	  hallucination	  does	  not	  supply	  a	  bad	  companion	  is	  that	  such	  a	  possibility	  is	  quite	  distant—there	  is	  no	  risk	  in	  one’s	  actual	  circumstance	  that	  one’s	  perceptual	  experiences	  are	  the	  produces	  of	  hallucination.	  (Note	  that	  it	  is	  not	  incumbent	  on	  the	  external	  world	  believer	  to	  show	  that	  such	  possibilities	  are	  distant.	  The	  standard	  insensitivity	  argument	  proceeds	  by	  trying	  to	  show	  that	  even	  if	  external	  world	  beliefs	  are	  true,	  they	  fail	  to	  be	  knowledge	  for	  reasons	  of	  insensitivity.	  But	  if	  insensitivity	  considerations	  have	  little	  bite	  when	  the	  possibilities	  of	  error	  are	  distant,	  then	  insensitivity	  alone	  is	  not	  a	  decisive	  indicator	  that	  knowledge	  is	  absent.)	  The	  deficiencies	  of	  insensitivity	  arguments	  could	  just	  as	  well	  have	  been	  illustrated	  using	  theological	  examples.	  	  Insensitivity	  arguments	  will,	  for	  the	  reasons	  given,	  be	  an	  unreliable	  tool	  for	  securing	  sceptical	  conclusions	  against	  either	  the	  atheist	  or	  theist.	  Suppose	  an	  
atheist	  believes	  that	  there	  is	  no	  God	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  were	  there	  all	  knowing	  omnibenevolent	  all	  powerful	  being,	  certain	  evils	  would	  not	  have	  occurred.	  It	  will	  not	  do	  to	  argue	  that	  were	  this	  counterfactual	  false	  the	  atheist	  would	  still	  believe	  it	  true.	  If	  the	  worlds	  where	  the	  counterfactual	  is	  false	  are	  remote	  possibilities,	  they	  will	  not	  supply	  bad	  companions,	  and	  insensitivity	  may	  be	  neither	  here	  nor	  there	  (for	  further	  discussion	  of	  similar	  arguments	  see	  White	  2010).	  	  
3.	  CLOSE	  WORLDS:	  private	  interpretation	  In	  the	  previous	  section	  we	  indicated,	  as	  a	  rough	  and	  ready	  heuristic,	  that	  errors	  at	  distant	  possibilities	  are	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  one	  actually	  knows.	  Assuming	  this	  heuristic,	  many	  appeals	  to	  possibilities	  of	  error	  will	  be	  dialectically	  ineffective	  since	  the	  believer	  will	  reckon	  the	  possibilities	  too	  distant	  to	  matter.	  (And	  even	  if	  we	  were	  merely	  trying	  to	  satisfy	  ourselves	  on	  the	  question	  whether	  the	  believer	  knows,	  we	  could	  only	  settle	  on	  the	  import	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  error	  once	  we	  have	  settled	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  distant	  possibility	  or	  a	  close	  one.)	  But	  restricting	  the	  errors	  that	  constitute	  bad	  companions	  to	  those	  that	  occur	  in	  nearby	  worlds	  does	  not	  render	  all	  theological	  belief	  immune	  to	  compelling	  sceptical	  challenges.	  As	  an	  illustration,	  consider	  someone	  who	  arrives	  at	  their	  theological	  beliefs	  by	  reading	  a	  sacred	  text	  and	  forming	  beliefs	  on	  this	  basis.	  Here	  there	  is	  plenty	  of	  room	  for	  arguing	  that	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  risk	  of	  error,	  and	  hence	  no	  knowledge.	  	   One	  way	  of	  fleshing	  out	  this	  argument	  relies	  on	  an	  important	  difference	  between	  interpretation	  of	  sacred	  texts	  and	  ordinary	  cases	  of	  knowledge	  by	  testimony.	  One	  can	  typically	  come	  to	  know	  by	  trusting	  an	  informant	  who	  knows.	  But	  many	  instances	  of	  interpretation	  of	  sacred	  texts	  will	  not	  fit	  this	  simple	  
model,	  since	  the	  route	  from	  trusting	  the	  text	  to	  belief	  is	  more	  complicated.	  Suppose	  a	  text	  contains	  two	  kinds	  of	  sentence:	  those	  that	  make	  ‘literal’	  assertions,	  which	  assert	  what	  is	  conventionally	  meant	  by	  the	  sentence,	  and	  those	  that	  make	  ‘metaphorical’	  assertions,	  which	  do	  not	  assert	  the	  conventional	  meaning	  of	  the	  sentence,	  but	  rather	  some	  other	  claims	  that	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  text	  as	  a	  whole	  plus	  facts	  about	  the	  context	  and	  intentions	  of	  the	  original	  author.	  (Thus	  the	  literal	  sentences	  are	  like	  a	  testifier	  who	  asserts	  ‘there	  is	  a	  dog	  outside’	  to	  communicate	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dog	  outside,	  while	  the	  metaphorical	  sentences	  are	  like	  a	  testifier	  who	  says	  ‘she’s	  the	  cream	  in	  my	  coffee’	  to	  communicate	  that	  they	  have	  found	  a	  soulmate.)	  What	  should	  one	  believe	  if	  one	  trusts	  the	  text?	  Even	  granting	  that	  some	  interpreters	  do	  succeed	  in	  believing	  the	  literal	  content	  of	  the	  literal	  assertions	  and	  the	  metaphorical	  content	  of	  the	  metaphorical	  assertions,	  it	  is	  not	  implausible	  that	  they	  could	  easily	  have	  taken	  a	  metaphorical	  sentence	  as	  literal.	  If	  these	  mistakes	  result	  in	  beliefs	  in	  falsehoods,	  then	  even	  the	  true	  beliefs	  arrived	  at	  by	  textual	  interpretation	  will	  have	  bad	  companions	  and	  will	  not	  be	  knowledge.	  (The	  situation	  will	  be	  especially	  bleak	  for	  someone	  who	  is	  robustly	  disposed	  to	  take	  everything	  as	  literal	  in	  a	  completely	  flatfooted	  way.	  If	  there	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  mix	  of	  the	  literal	  and	  the	  metaphorical	  sentences	  in	  the	  text,	  any	  true	  belief	  based	  on	  literal	  interpretation	  will	  plausibly	  have	  some	  bad	  companion	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  belief	  based	  on	  a	  literal	  interpretation	  of	  a	  metaphorical	  sentence.	  Such	  a	  person	  may	  of	  course	  believe	  many	  truths.	  But	  the	  epistemic	  price	  for	  her	  fundamentalism	  may	  be	  that	  she	  knows	  next	  to	  nothing.)	  	   We	  leave	  it	  to	  others	  to	  decide	  how	  much	  this	  simple	  case	  resembles	  an	  actual	  process	  by	  which	  some	  people	  arrive	  at	  their	  theological	  beliefs.	  Of	  course	  
the	  presence	  of	  a	  larger	  community	  engaged	  in	  joint	  interpretation	  of	  the	  text	  containing	  literal	  and	  metaphorical	  assertions	  will	  not	  help	  epistemologically,	  so	  long	  as	  the	  entire	  community	  could	  easily	  have	  mistaken	  metaphorical	  assertions	  for	  literal	  ones.	  It	  would	  however	  be	  a	  different	  matter	  if	  God	  directly	  guided	  the	  body	  of	  the	  Church	  in	  certain	  matters	  of	  scriptural	  interpretation	  and	  then	  individuals	  based	  their	  scriptural	  beliefs	  on	  trust	  in	  that	  authority.	  Beliefs	  formed	  in	  this	  way	  would	  plausibly	  be	  the	  results	  of	  rather	  different	  token	  belief-­‐forming	  processes	  than	  those	  that	  rely	  on	  the	  happenstance	  of	  private	  interpretation,	  and	  so	  the	  possible	  presence	  of	  the	  latter	  will	  not	  serve	  as	  bad	  companions	  for	  the	  former.	  (See	  Aquinas	  on	  the	  `habit	  of	  faith’,	  ST	  2a2e	  Q.1	  A.1,	  and	  discussion	  in	  Hawthorne	  2013.)	  	  Also	  there	  is	  an	  extra	  potential	  disanalogy	  with	  the	  testimony	  case.	  In	  cases	  where	  one	  gains	  knowledge	  by	  testimony,	  there	  is	  often	  a	  possibility	  that	  one	  mishears	  the	  testifier	  and	  arrives	  at	  a	  false	  belief.	  Imagine	  that	  Billy	  is	  talking	  with	  John	  on	  the	  telephone	  and	  as	  John	  utters	  the	  sentence	  ‘I	  am	  not	  in	  Oxford	  today.’	  If	  the	  phone	  line	  is	  unreliable	  and	  there	  is	  a	  chance	  that	  the	  line	  momentarily	  cuts	  out	  just	  as	  John	  utters	  ‘not’,	  then	  there	  is	  a	  chance	  that	  all	  Billy	  hears	  is	  ‘I	  am	  in	  Oxford	  today’	  and	  thereby	  forms	  the	  false	  belief	  that	  John	  is	  in	  Oxford.	  But	  assuming	  the	  line	  functions	  properly	  throughout	  the	  conversation,	  it	  seems	  absurd	  to	  say	  that	  Billy	  cannot	  know	  that	  John	  is	  not	  in	  Oxford.	  	  	   This	  points	  to	  the	  need	  for	  the	  additional	  SIMILARITY	  constraint	  on	  knowledge.	  Errors	  in	  nearby	  worlds	  are	  compatible	  with	  knowledge	  if	  they	  are	  the	  products	  of	  sufficiently	  dissimilar	  belief-­‐forming	  processes.	  This	  is	  exactly	  what	  is	  going	  on	  in	  the	  phone	  conversation	  between	  Billy	  and	  John:	  in	  the	  case	  where	  Billy	  comes	  to	  know	  from	  the	  conversation	  that	  John	  is	  not	  in	  Oxford,	  the	  
belief-­‐forming	  process	  is	  one	  that,	  among	  other	  things,	  puts	  Billy	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  what	  John	  said.	  This	  is	  a	  very	  different	  process	  than	  the	  one	  that	  leads	  to	  Billy’s	  belief	  in	  the	  case	  where	  the	  line	  cuts	  out	  at	  ‘not’,	  which	  does	  not	  even	  make	  available	  to	  Billy	  basic	  knowledge	  of	  what	  John	  was	  saying	  on	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  line.	  	  SIMILARITY	  will,	  by	  contrast,	  be	  hard-­‐pressed	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  interpreter	  of	  our	  text	  arrives	  at	  knowledge	  in	  those	  cases	  where	  she	  forms	  true	  beliefs:	  this	  is	  because	  it	  isn’t	  guaranteed	  that	  the	  interpreter’s	  belief	  forming	  process	  in	  the	  good	  case	  is	  one	  which	  enables	  her	  to	  come	  to	  know	  which	  sentences	  in	  the	  text	  are	  literal	  assertions,	  and	  which	  are	  metaphorical.	  (Of	  course,	  if	  she	  already	  knew	  what	  the	  text	  was	  saying,	  then	  she	  could	  come	  to	  know	  which	  sentences	  were	  the	  literal	  ones.	  But	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  belief-­‐forming	  process	  that	  allows	  her	  to	  know	  which	  sentences	  are	  literal,	  she	  will	  also	  find	  a	  belief-­‐forming	  process	  that	  is	  relevantly	  dissimilar	  to	  the	  process	  in	  bad	  cases	  to	  be	  unavailable	  to	  her.)	  Not	  every	  process	  that	  issues	  in	  true	  belief	  is	  a	  knowledge-­‐producing	  process,	  and	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  there	  are	  at	  least	  some	  cases	  resembling	  our	  sacred	  text	  interpreter	  where,	  even	  though	  the	  interpreter	  gets	  everything	  right,	  her	  beliefs	  are	  plagued	  by	  bad	  companions.	  	  
4.	  SIMILARITY:	  the	  plurality	  of	  religions	  	   One	  might	  attempt	  a	  variation	  on	  the	  sceptical	  argument	  in	  section	  2	  as	  follows.	  Given	  that	  environmental	  factors	  (including	  the	  beliefs	  of	  one’s	  parents	  and	  surrounding	  community)	  largely	  determine	  what	  a	  person	  believes,	  there	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  cause	  for	  scepticism	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  one	  could	  easily	  have	  been	  born	  into	  a	  different	  environment	  where	  one’s	  parents	  and	  interlocutors	  
propound	  different	  beliefs.	  It	  seems	  natural	  to	  conclude	  from	  this	  that	  one	  could	  easily	  have	  formed	  false	  beliefs	  by	  a	  similar	  process,	  where	  the	  process	  in	  question	  is	  that	  of	  accepting	  the	  beliefs	  of	  one’s	  immediate	  community.	  Thus,	  CLOSE	  WORLDS	  and	  SIMILARITY	  seem	  to	  imply	  that	  even	  if	  one	  happens	  to	  be	  born	  into	  an	  environment	  that	  produces	  true	  beliefs,	  those	  beliefs	  will	  have	  bad	  companions	  (see	  Goldberg	  2014	  for	  discussion	  of	  arguments	  of	  this	  kind).	  	   We	  should	  not	  be	  too	  quick	  to	  count	  all	  of	  the	  possibilities	  just	  gestured	  at	  as	  containing	  bad	  companions.	  Consider	  by	  analogy	  mundane	  knowledge	  of	  the	  future.	  We	  know	  we	  will	  eat	  this	  evening.	  Now	  there	  are	  people	  who	  before	  this	  evening	  will	  get	  murdered	  out	  of	  the	  blue	  or	  die	  of	  brain	  aneurisms	  with	  no	  warning.	  While	  there	  is	  a	  natural	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  are	  disposed	  to	  assent	  to	  ‘I	  could	  have	  easily	  been	  one	  of	  them’,	  the	  criterion	  for	  closeness	  connected	  to	  bad	  companionship	  must	  be	  more	  demanding,	  at	  least	  if	  we	  are	  to	  be	  non-­‐sceptics	  about	  mundane	  beliefs	  about	  the	  future.	  These	  cases	  will	  not	  count	  then	  as	  close	  in	  the	  epistemologically	  relevant	  sense.	  But	  if	  the	  beliefs	  of	  those	  people	  do	  not	  count	  as	  bad	  companions,	  why	  should	  beliefs	  of	  other	  religious	  communities	  count	  as	  bad	  companions?	  There	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  the	  theological	  sceptic	  will	  deploy	  a	  lax	  criterion	  of	  closeness	  that	  if	  used	  more	  widely	  would	  generate	  widespread	  scepticism.	  In	  short,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  at	  all	  that	  the	  argument	  does	  not	  suffer	  from	  the	  same	  basic	  flaw	  as	  sensitivity,	  namely	  by	  relying	  on	  possibilities	  that	  are	  too	  distant	  to	  be	  epistemologically	  relevant.	  	  Further,	  even	  granting	  that	  the	  cases	  are	  close,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  they	  pass	  the	  similarity	  test	  for	  bad	  companionship.	  Granted	  there	  is	  an	  obvious	  resemblance	  between	  the	  good	  and	  bad	  cases	  here:	  in	  each,	  one	  forms	  a	  belief	  in	  response	  to	  the	  prevalent	  beliefs	  in	  one’s	  environment.	  But	  to	  think	  that	  this	  
suffices	  to	  make	  the	  bad	  cases	  bad	  companions	  to	  the	  good	  would	  be	  to	  ignore	  the	  need	  for	  fine-­‐grained	  comparisons	  between	  the	  token	  belief-­‐forming	  processes:	  merely	  identifying	  a	  general	  category	  like	  ‘deference	  to	  one’s	  parents’	  will	  not	  suffice	  to	  establish	  the	  needed	  similarity.	  	   The	  latter	  approach,	  which	  is	  to	  be	  rejected,	  is	  akin	  to	  denying	  that	  true	  beliefs	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perception	  are	  knowledge	  in	  cases	  where	  there	  is	  some	  nearby	  circumstance	  where	  a	  false	  belief	  is	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perception.	  But	  a	  nearby	  false	  belief	  that	  is	  formed	  by	  some	  perceptual	  method	  isn’t	  necessarily	  a	  barrier	  to	  knowledge:	  suppose	  there	  is	  a	  copy	  of	  War	  and	  
Peace	  on	  the	  coffee	  table,	  and	  Sally	  looks	  at	  it	  from	  the	  side	  and	  concludes	  that	  
War	  and	  Peace	  is	  long	  after	  seeing	  the	  size	  of	  the	  book.	  Suppose	  moreover	  that	  there	  is	  a	  nearby	  possibility	  where	  she	  doesn’t	  see	  the	  book’s	  profile	  but	  instead	  opens	  to	  the	  table	  of	  contents	  and	  looks	  at	  the	  page	  count.	  If	  the	  book’s	  printer	  was	  careless	  with	  the	  table	  of	  contents	  and	  listed	  the	  Index	  as	  starting	  on	  page	  54,	  then	  Sally	  could	  easily	  have	  formed	  the	  false	  belief	  that	  War	  and	  Peace	  is	  not	  long	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  table	  of	  contents.	  	  This,	  however,	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  whether	  she	  knows	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  book’s	  profile.	  Even	  though	  both	  her	  actual	  true	  belief	  and	  her	  nearby	  false	  belief	  are	  formed	  by	  broadly	  visual	  processes,	  this	  isn’t	  sufficient	  to	  establish	  relevant	  similarity.	  The	  token	  belief-­‐forming	  process	  of	  Sally’s	  looking	  at	  the	  table	  of	  contents	  is	  intuitively	  very	  dissimilar	  from	  the	  token	  belief-­‐forming	  process	  of	  Sally’s	  looking	  at	  the	  book’s	  profile,	  and	  this	  dissimilarity	  guarantees	  that	  Sally	  isn’t	  prevented	  from	  knowing	  by	  a	  careless	  printer	  when	  she	  doesn’t	  even	  open	  the	  book.	  
The	  argument	  from	  religious	  pluralism	  should	  fare	  even	  worse	  than	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  conclusion	  that	  Sally	  doesn’t	  know	  in	  the	  case	  described	  above.	  The	  token	  causal	  processes	  by	  which	  people	  in	  rival	  religious	  communities	  arrive	  at	  their	  beliefs	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  at	  least	  as	  dissimilar	  as	  the	  token	  causal	  process	  that	  leads	  to	  Sally	  believing	  that	  War	  and	  Peace	  is	  long	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  looking	  at	  its	  profile	  is	  from	  the	  token	  causal	  process	  that	  would	  have	  lead	  her	  to	  the	  belief	  that	  it	  is	  not	  long	  if	  she	  looked	  at	  the	  table	  of	  contents	  instead	  (see	  Dunaway	  MS	  for	  more	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  etiology	  of	  beliefs	  and	  the	  epistemologically	  relevant	  similarity-­‐relations	  between	  token	  processes).	  	  
5.	  CLOSURE:	  counterfactuals	  and	  evil	  Assuming	  CLOSURE,	  if	  one	  possesses	  knowledge	  that	  entails	  an	  answer	  to	  a	  question,	  then	  one	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  knowledgeably	  answer	  that	  question	  (at	  least	  assuming	  suitable	  deductive	  competence).	  For	  example	  if	  one	  knows	  one	  has	  hands	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  has	  hands	  entails	  that	  one	  is	  not	  a	  brain	  in	  a	  vat,	  then	  knowing	  that	  one	  has	  hands	  entails	  that	  one	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  whether	  one	  is	  a	  brain	  in	  a	  vat.	  Even	  if	  one’s	  didn’t	  know	  that	  one	  isn’t	  a	  brain	  in	  a	  vat	  already,	  one	  could	  in	  principle	  come	  to	  arrive	  at	  such	  knowledge	  by	  deduction.	  	   Let	  us	  make	  a	  few	  more	  quick	  observations	  about	  the	  brain	  in	  a	  vat	  example	  just	  given.	  Competent	  deduction	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  has	  hands	  may	  not	  be	  the	  most	  common	  or	  natural	  way	  to	  come	  to	  know	  that	  one	  is	  not	  a	  brain	  in	  a	  vat.	  But	  one	  shouldn’t	  think	  either	  that	  in	  order	  to	  know	  that	  one	  has	  hands	  one	  must	  have	  already	  come	  to	  know	  that	  one	  is	  not	  a	  brain	  in	  a	  vat.	  After	  all,	  one	  
might	  come	  to	  know	  that	  one	  has	  hands	  even	  if	  one	  had	  never	  even	  considered	  wild	  sceptical	  hypotheses.	  	  	   This	  structural	  observation	  has	  application	  to	  theological	  settings.	  As	  a	  case	  in	  point	  we	  will	  take	  the	  problem	  of	  evil.	  First,	  consider	  a	  warm	  up	  example.	  	  	   Suppose	  a	  community	  believes	  some	  former	  people	  become	  tigers	  in	  later	  stages	  of	  their	  existence.	  They	  believe	  further	  that	  some	  of	  these	  people	  take	  on	  the	  form	  of	  invisible	  tigers	  and	  that,	  indeed,	  there	  are	  always	  invisible	  tigers	  right	  in	  front	  of	  us.	  (One	  Javanese	  population	  has	  beliefs	  along	  these	  lines	  concerning	  a	  supposed	  were-­‐tiger	  named	  Buyut	  Cili-­‐-­‐see	  Beatty	  1999:53-­‐54.)	  	  Now	  Jones,	  who	  hasn’t	  considered	  any	  of	  this,	  forms	  the	  belief	  that	  if	  there	  were	  a	  tiger	  in	  front	  of	  him,	  he	  would	  flee	  (where	  the	  etiology	  of	  this	  belief	  is	  pretty	  much	  what	  one	  would	  expect	  for	  a	  typical	  New	  Yorker).	  Suppose	  moreover	  that	  the	  world	  is	  one	  where	  belief	  about	  invisible	  tigers	  are	  all	  wrong	  and	  couldn’t	  easily	  have	  been	  true	  either.	  And	  while	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  a	  fleshy	  tiger	  to	  be	  right	  in	  front	  of	  him	  unnoticed	  (thanks	  to	  disguise,	  blindness	  or	  whatever),	  that	  couldn’t	  easily	  have	  happened	  either.	  Jones’	  belief	  has	  impeccable	  credentials	  –	  by	  our	  lights,	  it	  is	  pretty	  obviously	  a	  case	  of	  knowledge.	  	  But	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  proposition	  that	  if	  Jones	  had	  a	  tiger	  in	  front	  of	  him,	  he	  would	  flee	  entails	  the	  falsity	  of	  the	  proposition	  that	  Jones	  has	  an	  invisible	  tiger	  in	  front	  of	  him.	  (For	  since	  he	  doesn’t	  flee,	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  tiger-­‐religion	  would	  make	  for	  a	  counterfactual	  with	  a	  true	  antecedent	  and	  a	  false	  consequent.	  By	  standard	  counterfactual	  logic,	  including	  the	  ‘strong	  centering’	  condition	  for	  counterfactuals	  as	  discussed	  in	  Lewis	  1973,	  this	  entails	  the	  falsity	  of	  the	  counterfactual.)	  Given	  CLOSURE	  and	  Jones’s	  knowledge	  that	  if	  there	  were	  a	  tiger	  in	  front	  of	  him,	  he	  would	  flee,	  Jones	  is	  then	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  by	  deduction	  that	  
the	  content	  of	  the	  tiger-­‐religion	  is	  false.	  This	  example	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  general	  pattern:	  very	  ordinary	  counterfactuals	  that	  do	  not	  encode	  religious	  ideology	  can	  nevertheless	  entail	  the	  falsity	  of	  various	  religious	  views.	  Moreover	  if	  we	  are	  in	  an	  environment	  where	  we	  know	  these	  counterfactuals,	  then	  CLOSURE	  guarantees	  that	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  know	  the	  falsity	  of	  these	  religious	  hypotheses.	  	   Let	  us	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  evil	  itself.	  Suppose	  someone	  who	  had	  never	  considered	  the	  views	  of	  the	  Judeo-­‐Christian	  tradition	  encounters	  an	  awful	  crime	  scene.	  The	  person	  forms	  the	  counterfactual	  belief	  that	  if	  a	  good	  person	  had	  been	  able	  to	  prevent	  this	  crime	  that	  person	  would	  have.	  Now	  suppose	  we	  are	  in	  a	  world	  where	  the	  Judeo-­‐Christian	  view	  is	  false	  and	  couldn’t	  easily	  have	  been	  true.	  And	  while	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  ordinary	  fleshy	  people	  could	  have	  been	  good,	  been	  able	  to	  prevent	  the	  crime	  but	  had	  excellent	  reasons	  for	  not	  doing	  so,	  such	  possibilities	  are	  also	  rather	  distant	  in	  this	  case.	  Here,	  just	  as	  in	  the	  last	  case,	  the	  person’s	  belief	  has	  impeccable	  credentials	  and	  counts	  as	  knowledge.	  But	  this	  person’s	  knowledge	  entails	  that	  there	  is	  no	  omniscient,	  omnibenevolent,	  omniscient	  being.	  (Again,	  the	  reason	  is	  the	  same	  as	  in	  the	  tiger-­‐religion	  case:	  since	  no	  one	  did	  stop	  the	  crime,	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  Judeo-­‐Christian	  religion	  would	  make	  for	  a	  counterfactual	  with	  a	  true	  antecedent	  and	  false	  consequent,	  which	  by	  standard	  logic	  would	  make	  the	  counterfactual	  false.)	  And	  so,	  given	  CLOSURE,	  the	  person	  in	  such	  a	  situation	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  the	  falsity	  of	  the	  Judeo-­‐Christian	  tradition.	  (Indeed	  the	  person’s	  knowledge	  about	  evil	  logically	  entails	  the	  falsity	  of	  that	  tradition	  –	  this	  suggests	  to	  us	  that	  the	  commonly	  made	  distinction	  between	  the	  ‘logical’	  and	  ‘evidential’	  problems	  of	  evil	  is	  not	  particularly	  helpful.)	  	  
The	  person’s	  counterfactual	  belief	  is	  not	  expressed	  using	  the	  ideology	  of	  the	  Judeo-­‐Christian	  tradition.	  But	  as	  before,	  we	  have	  a	  situation	  where	  a	  very	  mundane	  counterfactual	  entails	  that	  the	  religion	  is	  false.	  Moreover,	  as	  we	  have	  emphasized,	  there	  is	  a	  very	  strong	  case	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  counterfactual	  is	  knowable	  in	  worlds	  where	  the	  Judeo-­‐Christian	  tradition	  is	  false.	  This	  kind	  of	  case	  shouldn’t	  seem	  excessively	  threatening	  to	  someone	  who	  believes	  in	  God—after	  all,	  the	  deduction	  described	  above	  is	  only	  available	  to	  someone	  who	  is	  in	  a	  world	  where	  the	  Judeo-­‐Christian	  religion	  is	  false.	  (Similarly	  there	  is	  nothing	  especially	  threatening	  for	  the	  theist	  as	  such	  about	  granting	  that,	  were	  God	  not	  to	  exist,	  one	  could	  know	  that	  God	  doesn’t	  exist.	  It	  should	  seem	  even	  more	  benign	  from	  the	  theist’s	  perspective	  to	  grant	  that	  mundane	  counterfactual	  knowledge	  of	  the	  kind	  described	  above	  is	  available	  in	  such	  worlds.)	  But	  there	  are	  some	  theistic	  perspectives	  on	  evil	  which	  require	  one	  to	  be	  able	  to	  argue	  from	  a	  neutral	  position	  that	  there	  is	  no	  God	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  evil,	  and	  these	  are	  forced	  to	  deny	  either	  CLOSURE	  or	  the	  existence	  of	  mundane	  counterfactual	  knowledge	  in	  such	  worlds.	  (Such	  strategies	  are	  found	  in	  Wykstra	  1984	  and	  Bergmann	  2001;	  see	  Benton,	  Hawthorne,	  and	  Isaacs	  forthcoming	  for	  critical	  discussion	  of	  those	  strategies	  as	  well	  as	  overlapping	  discussion	  of	  some	  of	  the	  ideas	  explored	  here.)	  Reflection	  on	  the	  soundness	  of	  the	  use	  of	  counterfactual	  knowledge	  to	  know	  the	  falsity	  of	  the	  tiger-­‐religion	  from	  above	  suggests	  that	  these	  approaches	  needlessly	  overreach,	  even	  from	  a	  theistic	  perspective.	  	  
6.	  COUNTER-­‐CLOSURE:	  shaky	  foundations	  COUNTER-­‐CLOSURE	  –	  a	  slightly	  more	  tendentious	  idea	  than	  CLOSURE	  –	  says	  that	  (roughly)	  one	  can’t	  get	  knowledge	  from	  unknown	  premises.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  find	  
myriad	  theological	  applications	  for	  this	  idea.	  Return	  to	  our	  fundamentalist	  from	  section	  3.	  Suppose	  a	  large	  chunk	  of	  the	  bible	  is	  true	  but	  that	  the	  fundamentalist	  belief	  in	  any	  given	  sentence	  is	  based	  on	  the	  false	  belief	  that	  every	  sentence	  is	  the	  literal	  truth.	  Assuming	  COUNTER-­‐CLOSURE	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  price	  of	  this	  false	  belief	  is	  that	  none	  of	  the	  true	  beliefs	  formed	  by	  reading	  the	  text	  count	  as	  knowledge.	  Further,	  all	  sorts	  of	  mundane	  non-­‐religious	  beliefs	  about	  the	  world	  may	  be	  indicted	  by	  falsely	  believed	  and	  hence	  unknown	  religious	  foundations.	  For	  example,	  as	  a	  loved	  one	  leaves	  the	  house	  one	  might	  go	  on	  to	  base	  a	  belief	  that	  they	  will	  return	  on	  the	  false	  belief	  that	  it	  is	  a	  priority	  of	  God’s	  to	  keep	  them	  safe.	  Even	  if	  one	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  that	  they	  will	  return,	  one	  arguably	  fails	  to	  exercise	  this	  capacity	  by	  basing	  one’s	  belief	  in	  a	  safe	  return	  on	  speculative	  theology.	  (Clearly,	  it	  is	  very	  easy	  to	  find	  all	  sorts	  of	  examples	  of	  cases	  where,	  assuming	  COUNTER-­‐CLOSURE,	  knowledge	  failure	  is	  induced	  by	  a	  faulty	  theological	  basis.)	  	  	  	  
7.	  KNOWLEDGE-­‐ENTAILING	  STATES:	  faith	  without	  belief	  In	  response	  to	  worries	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  knowledge	  in	  the	  theological	  domain,	  some	  have	  responded	  by	  proposing	  that	  the	  central	  propositional	  attitude	  in	  a	  religious	  context—faith—does	  not	  require	  belief.	  	  (See	  Howard-­‐Snyder	  2014.)	  One	  attractive	  feature	  of	  this	  approach	  in	  the	  face	  of	  sceptical	  worries	  is	  that	  it	  leaves	  space	  for	  a	  cognitive	  life	  that	  is	  religiously	  serious	  yet	  does	  not	  violate	  any	  epistemic	  requirements	  if	  one	  is	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  theological	  claims.	  	  In	  particular	  this	  approach	  respects	  the	  relationship	  between	  knowledge	  and	  belief	  envisaged	  in	  NORMATIVE	  CONNECTIONS	  –	  if	  one	  ought	  to	  believe	  a	  proposition	  only	  if	  one	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  it,	  then	  if	  faith	  requires	  
belief	  and	  one	  is	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  theological	  claims,	  faith	  will	  be	  epistemically	  prohibited	  as	  well.	  Thus	  divorcing	  faith	  from	  belief	  (which	  need	  not	  involve	  holding	  that	  faith	  is	  compatible	  with	  outright	  disbelief)	  promises	  to	  protect	  faith	  from	  epistemic	  criticism	  if	  knowledge	  is	  difficult	  or	  impossible	  to	  come	  by.	  	   Suppose,	  then,	  that	  one	  can	  rationally	  have	  faith	  without	  being	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  the	  relevant	  propositions	  (thus	  in	  the	  envisaged	  scenario	  one	  is	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  rationally	  believe	  these	  propositions).	  One	  might	  think	  that	  the	  disconnect	  is	  highly	  local:	  one	  can	  have	  faith	  without	  knowledge	  but	  the	  rest	  of	  one’s	  cognitive	  life	  is	  left	  intact.	  But	  if,	  as	  KNOWLEDGE-­‐ENTAILING	  STAES	  claims,	  knowledge	  is	  tied	  to	  myriad	  other	  notions,	  then	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  divorce	  will	  spread.	  	   To	  take	  one	  example:	  suppose	  Tim	  has	  faith	  that	  God	  has	  told	  him	  to	  become	  a	  missionary.	  If	  we	  fill	  in	  the	  details	  of	  the	  case	  so	  that	  there	  is	  a	  God	  and	  God	  in	  fact	  told	  Tim	  to	  become	  a	  missionary,	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  say	  in	  this	  case	  that	  Tim’s	  reason	  for	  becoming	  a	  missionary	  is	  that	  God	  has	  told	  him	  to	  do	  so.	  But	  given,	  as	  KNOWLEDGE-­‐ENTAILING	  STATES	  claims,	  that	  having	  p	  as	  a	  personal	  reason	  requires	  knowledge	  of	  p,	  God’s	  directions	  will	  be	  unavailable	  as	  Tim’s	  reason	  for	  becoming	  a	  missionary.	  For	  if	  even	  if	  Tim’s	  faith	  is	  epistemically	  uncriticizable,	  it	  can’t	  on	  present	  assumptions	  be	  that	  Tim’s	  reasons	  for	  becoming	  a	  missionary	  include	  that	  God	  told	  him	  to	  do	  so;	  Tim’s	  faith	  is	  that	  of	  someone	  who	  isn’t	  in	  a	  position	  know	  that	  God	  has	  issued	  the	  relevant	  directives.	  (Of	  course	  facts	  about	  God	  could	  be	  explanatory	  reasons	  why	  one	  does	  something	  but	  they	  cannot,	  according	  to	  KNOWLEDGE-­‐ENTAILING	  STATES,	  be	  one’s	  personal	  or	  motivating	  
reasons	  for	  doing	  anything.)	  It	  seems	  somewhat	  tragic	  to	  be	  deprived	  of	  using	  facts	  about	  God	  as	  one’s	  reasons	  for	  acting.	  	  	   	  On	  the	  faith-­‐without-­‐belief	  view,	  there	  will	  be	  other	  examples	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  knowledge	  spreading	  to	  other	  areas	  of	  one’s	  cognitive	  and	  practical	  life	  as	  well.	  	  If	  seeing	  that	  p	  requires	  that	  one	  knows	  that	  p,	  then	  someone	  who	  has	  faith	  that	  God	  works	  wonders	  in	  the	  world	  won’t	  be	  able	  to	  see	  that	  God	  has	  worked	  wonders.	  Or	  again,	  plausibly	  one	  cannot	  be	  happy	  that	  p	  unless	  one	  knows	  that	  p.	  Then,	  someone	  with	  knowledgeless	  faith	  cannot	  be	  happy	  that	  there	  is	  a	  personal	  loving	  God	  even	  if	  there	  is	  one.	  	  
8.	  IGNORANCE-­‐ENTAILING	  STATES:	  risk	  and	  good	  will	  We	  have	  been	  focusing	  on	  some	  potentially	  negative	  ramifications	  of	  a	  failure	  to	  know	  that	  there	  is	  a	  God;	  these,	  we	  have	  been	  emphasizing,	  will	  constitute	  perhaps	  unwelcome	  consequences	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  faith	  that	  is	  knowledge-­‐free.	  But	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  see	  that	  a	  failure	  to	  know	  may	  contribute	  positively	  to	  our	  religious	  lives:	  some	  other	  practical	  and	  epistemic	  states	  require	  the	  absence	  of	  knowledge.	  We	  offer	  a	  few	  illustrations	  of	  this	  theme.	  Our	  first	  illustration	  is	  inspired	  by	  Kant’s	  own	  discussion	  of	  the	  hiddenness	  of	  God.	  (Here	  we	  will	  gloss	  over	  difficult	  problems	  with	  cashing	  out	  the	  thesis	  that	  God	  is	  hidden	  in	  knowledge-­‐theoretic	  terms:	  if	  one’s	  evidence	  just	  is	  what	  one	  knows,	  then	  a	  superficial	  gloss	  on	  the	  hiddenness	  of	  God	  according	  to	  which	  there	  isn’t	  great	  evidence	  that	  God	  exists	  will	  be	  unsatisfactory.	  For	  either	  one	  can	  know	  that	  God	  exists,	  or	  one	  cannot	  know.	  The	  former	  option	  appears	  to	  entail	  that	  hiddenness	  is	  false	  because	  the	  evidential	  probability	  on	  one’s	  evidence	  that	  God	  exists	  will	  be	  1;	  on	  the	  latter	  option	  hiddenness	  directly	  
implies	  scepticism.	  This	  would	  be	  unfortunate	  for	  hiddenness	  theorists	  because	  many	  contemporary	  theists	  have	  been	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  God	  is	  hidden	  but	  would	  not	  grant	  a	  claim	  that	  directly	  implies	  scepticism	  in	  this	  way.	  No	  doubt	  some	  will	  lean	  on	  a	  perceptual	  gloss	  instead	  -­‐-­‐	  one	  can	  after	  all	  know	  that	  something	  exists	  even	  if	  one	  can’t	  perceive	  it	  -­‐-­‐	  but	  more	  will	  be	  done	  to	  work	  this	  out.	  We	  presumably	  don’t	  employ	  perception	  to	  come	  to	  know	  the	  law	  of	  excluded	  middle,	  but	  there	  presumably	  isn’t	  an	  analogous	  hiddenness	  phenomenon	  for	  logical	  truths.)	  It	  is	  a	  common	  thought	  that	  morally	  praiseworthy	  action	  not	  only	  requires	  doing	  the	  morally	  required	  action	  but	  also	  doing	  it	  for	  the	  right	  reason.	  Kant	  is	  an	  extreme	  example	  of	  this,	  where	  he	  held	  that	  only	  actions	  done	  from	  the	  motivation	  to	  do	  one’s	  duty	  have	  moral	  worth.	  If	  the	  only	  reasons	  one	  can	  appropriately	  act	  for	  are	  things	  one	  can	  know,	  then	  by	  granting	  that	  one	  can	  know	  theological	  claims,	  morally	  good	  action	  may	  be	  difficult	  or	  even	  impossible.	  	   Kant	  claims	  something	  along	  these	  lines	  when	  he	  says	  that	  if	  ``God	  and	  eternity	  with	  their	  awful	  majesty	  [stood]	  unceasingly	  before	  our	  eyes’’	  then	  ``most	  actions	  conforming	  to	  the	  law	  would	  be	  done	  from	  fear	  […]	  and	  the	  moral	  worth	  of	  actions	  […]	  would	  not	  exist	  at	  all’’	  (121-­‐2).	  On	  one	  implementation	  of	  this	  idea,	  it	  will	  be	  at	  the	  very	  least	  psychologically	  very	  difficult	  to	  act	  form	  duty	  if,	  among	  the	  things	  one	  knows,	  are	  claims	  such	  as	  those	  who	  act	  immorally	  will	  
be	  eternally	  punished,	  or	  everyone	  who	  performs	  right	  actions	  will	  receive	  eternal	  
reward.	  If	  one	  knows	  these	  claims,	  then	  it	  is	  at	  least	  appropriate	  for	  these	  claims	  to	  be	  one’s	  reason	  for	  action.	  When	  faced	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  help	  an	  old	  lady	  across	  the	  street,	  the	  threat	  of	  eternal	  punishment	  is	  available	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  helping.	  Moreover,	  it	  will	  be	  an	  especially	  psychologically	  salient	  one:	  someone	  
who	  genuinely	  knows	  that	  they	  are	  under	  the	  threat	  of	  eternal	  punishment	  will	  be	  hard-­‐pressed	  to	  ignore	  this	  consideration	  when	  reasoning	  about	  whether	  to	  help.	  But	  in	  doing	  so	  they	  will	  deprive	  their	  action	  of	  genuine	  moral	  worth.	  The	  presence	  of	  a	  good	  will,	  at	  least	  in	  psychologically	  realistic	  individuals,	  may	  well	  be	  an	  ignorance-­‐entailing	  state:	  perhaps	  the	  only	  way	  to	  secure	  the	  conclusion	  that	  we	  do	  act	  for	  the	  right	  reasons	  is	  to	  deny	  that	  we	  know	  what	  the	  eternal	  consequences	  of	  our	  actions	  will	  be.	  	   A	  second	  illustration	  of	  this	  idea	  relies	  on	  the	  connection	  between	  knowledge	  and	  risk	  alluded	  to	  earlier.	  Suppose	  that,	  as	  we	  suggested	  in	  section	  1,	  risking	  that	  p	  is	  incompatible	  with	  knowing	  that	  not-­‐p.	  Then	  any	  states	  that	  require	  the	  presence	  of	  risk	  will	  also	  be	  incompatible	  with	  knowledge.	  Moreover	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  states	  that	  we	  think	  of	  as	  virtuous	  are,	  prima	  facie	  at	  least,	  states	  that	  do	  require	  the	  presence	  of	  risk.	  For	  example,	  because	  of	  its	  connection	  to	  risk,	  courage	  is	  naturally	  understood	  as	  requiring	  the	  absence	  of	  knowledge:	  one	  can’t	  courageously	  enter	  a	  battle	  if	  one	  isn’t	  risking	  anything	  by	  doing	  so.	  And	  one	  can’t	  risk	  that	  would	  lose	  one’s	  life	  in	  a	  fight	  (for	  instance)	  if	  when	  entering	  one	  knew	  that	  one	  would	  not	  die.	  Some	  have	  thought	  that	  the	  value	  of	  faith	  lies	  partly	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  a	  courageous	  cognitive	  act	  (cf.	  Kierkegaard’s	  Fear	  and	  
Trembling	  where	  Abraham’s	  faith	  is	  courageous	  and	  therefore	  praiseworthy	  precisely	  because	  he	  cannot	  know	  what	  to	  do	  because	  of	  the	  contradiction	  between	  religious	  and	  ethical	  requirements	  on	  his	  action).	  Rejecting	  theological	  scepticism	  makes	  this	  kind	  of	  praiseworthy	  cognitive	  act	  unavailable.	  	  It	  is	  also	  somewhat	  natural	  to	  think	  that	  the	  kind	  of	  reliance	  distinctive	  of	  trust	  is	  one	  that	  includes	  risk,	  but	  we	  don’t	  intend	  to	  take	  a	  stand	  on	  that	  here.	  Even	  if	  trust	  doesn’t	  require	  risk,	  it	  is	  arguable	  that	  commendable	  trust	  does.	  
Similarly	  it	  is	  arguable	  that	  hoping	  that	  p	  requires	  at	  least	  some	  risk	  that	  not-­‐p	  and	  hence	  requires	  not	  knowing	  that	  p.	  Insofar	  as	  one	  wishes	  to	  make	  these	  ignorance-­‐entailing	  states	  available	  in	  practical	  and	  religious	  life,	  one	  may	  be	  forced	  to	  deny	  that	  we	  can	  know	  theological	  claims.	  	  
	  
9.	  NORMATIVE	  CONNECTIONS:	  dogmatism	  Let	  us	  return	  to	  the	  knowledge-­‐action	  connections,	  viz.:	  KRIPKE:	  If	  A	  knows	  that	  taking	  an	  action	  (i.e.,	  any	  action)	  of	  type	  T	  leads	  to	  consequence	  C,	  and	  A	  wishes	  above	  all	  else	  to	  avoid	  C	  (i.e.,	  this	  is	  the	  only	  relevant	  issue),	  then	  A	  should	  resolve	  now	  not	  to	  take	  any	  action	  of	  type	  T.	  	  COMPANION	  KRIPKE:	  If	  A	  knows	  that	  taking	  any	  action	  of	  type	  T	  leads	  to	  consequence	  C	  and	  doesn’t	  know	  of	  any	  action	  that	  is	  not	  of	  type	  T	  that	  it	  leads	  to	  consequence	  C,	  and	  A	  wishes	  above	  all	  else	  to	  secure	  C	  then	  A	  should	  resolve	  to	  perform	  an	  action	  of	  type	  T.	  	  As	  Kripke	  is	  aware,	  the	  connection	  he	  cites	  yields	  a	  prima	  facie	  case	  for	  dogmatic	  resolutions	  (on	  the	  part	  of	  a	  knower)	  to	  ignore	  powerful	  counterevidence.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  if	  one	  knows	  p	  then	  (at	  least	  if	  one	  knows	  one	  believes	  p)	  one	  knows	  that	  one	  has	  a	  true	  belief	  that	  p.	  But	  if	  one	  really	  wants	  a	  true	  belief	  that	  p	  and	  knows	  that	  paying	  attention	  to	  powerful	  counterevidence	  will	  induce	  loss	  of	  belief,	  then	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  think	  that	  according	  to	  KRIPKE	  one	  should	  resolve	  not	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  powerful	  counterevidence.	  The	  KRIPKE	  principle	  has	  particularly	  forceful	  application	  in	  the	  religious	  case.	  After	  all,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  very	  ordinary	  beliefs	  it	  may	  be	  that	  by	  paying	  attention	  to	  powerful	  
counterevidence	  one	  gains	  new	  true	  beliefs	  even	  if	  one	  loses	  an	  old	  true	  belief	  when	  counterevidence	  comes	  in	  (one	  will,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  be	  able	  to	  know	  what	  the	  counterevidence	  was).	  And	  there	  won’t	  be	  anything	  that	  special	  about	  the	  original	  true	  belief	  that	  makes	  it	  especially	  important	  to	  secure	  it.	  But	  in	  the	  religious	  case	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  certain	  people	  care	  more	  than	  anything	  else	  about	  retaining	  a	  true	  belief	  in	  God	  and	  would	  be	  more	  than	  happy	  to	  sacrifice	  the	  opportunity	  to	  learn	  about	  other	  subject	  matters	  in	  order	  to	  retain	  it.	  	  Here	  is	  one	  straightforward	  application	  of	  COMPANION	  KRIPKE	  to	  this	  kind	  of	  case.	  To	  make	  this	  especially	  dramatic,	  let	  us	  imagine	  that	  someone	  who	  knows	  that	  theism	  is	  true	  is	  given	  the	  opportunity	  of	  taking	  a	  pill	  that	  she	  knows	  ensures	  that,	  come	  what	  may,	  she	  will	  belief	  that	  theism	  is	  true.	  Given	  COMPANION	  KRIPKE	  and	  a	  suitable	  valuation	  priority	  for	  believing	  in	  God,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  person	  should	  take	  the	  pill—taking	  the	  pill	  is	  the	  only	  action	  she	  knows	  of	  that	  will	  produce	  the	  consequence	  of	  continued	  belief	  in	  God,	  and	  this	  is	  by	  hypothesis	  what	  she	  wants	  above	  everything	  else.	  	  (The	  same	  point	  can	  be	  made	  a	  little	  more	  precise	  by	  running	  the	  whole	  discussion	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  decision	  theory	  where	  the	  likelihood	  of	  any	  outcome	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  likelihood	  conditional	  on	  what	  one	  knows.	  This	  will	  also	  allow	  us	  to	  take	  care	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  KRIPKE	  and	  KRIPKE	  COMPANION	  need	  further	  refinement.	  For	  example,	  suppose	  one	  knows	  that	  act	  T	  will	  lead	  to	  what	  one	  wishes	  above	  all	  to	  avoid	  and	  that	  not	  doing	  T	  will	  almost	  certainly	  lead	  to	  that	  horrible	  outcome	  and	  moreover	  will	  certainly	  generate	  a	  second	  bad	  side	  effect.	  The	  decision	  theory	  will	  tell	  one	  to	  do	  T	  but	  the	  unrefined	  KRIPKE	  principle	  will	  not.	  None	  of	  this	  should	  matter	  much	  in	  the	  contexts	  we	  are	  discussing.)	  
	   As	  Kripke	  is	  aware,	  these	  kinds	  of	  considerations	  can	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  quite	  compelling	  sceptical	  argument.	  For	  it	  seems	  that	  we	  should	  not	  take	  the	  dogmatism	  pill.	  But	  if	  we	  know	  that	  there	  is	  a	  God	  and	  the	  KRIPKE	  and	  COMPANION	  KRIPKE	  principles	  are	  along	  the	  right	  lines	  (and	  it	  seems	  that	  they,	  or	  some	  successors	  refined	  in	  the	  direction	  outlined	  above,	  are)	  then	  we	  should	  take	  the	  pill.	  So,	  by	  modus	  tollens,	  we	  don’t	  know	  there	  is	  a	  God.	  (It	  is	  worth	  considering	  the	  same	  argument	  in	  connection	  with	  heretic-­‐burning.	  If	  Giordano	  Bruno’s	  inquisitors	  knew	  that	  he	  would	  go	  to	  hell	  were	  he	  not	  to	  recant	  and	  knew	  that	  he	  wouldn’t	  recant	  without	  purging	  by	  fire,	  then,	  given	  the	  principles	  and/or	  a	  suitably	  low	  utility	  assignment	  to	  hell,	  purging	  by	  fire	  is	  the	  recommended	  action.	  No	  matter	  what	  our	  religious	  orientation,	  we	  should	  perhaps	  revisit	  the	  question	  whether	  the	  inquisitors	  knew.)	  	  
10.	  Conclusion	  There	  are	  various	  other	  candidate	  structural	  features	  that	  might	  ramify	  in	  important	  ways	  in	  the	  religious	  case.	  Let	  us	  briefly	  mention	  two.	  First,	  many	  philosophers	  think	  that	  ‘know’	  is	  a	  context-­‐sensitive	  verb	  that	  expresses	  different	  relations	  in	  different	  contexts	  of	  use.	  As	  the	  idea	  is	  typically	  developed,	  there	  are	  certain	  contexts	  in	  which	  ‘know’	  expresses	  a	  relation	  to	  a	  proposition	  that	  can	  only	  be	  achieved	  by	  someone	  who	  passes	  incredibly	  high	  epistemic	  standards,	  where	  in	  other	  context,	  ‘know’	  expresses	  a	  relation	  that	  is	  far	  less	  demanding.	  Proponents	  of	  the	  idea	  then	  articulate	  mechanism	  by	  which	  the	  standards	  relevant	  to	  a	  context	  can	  vary.	  Proposals	  along	  these	  lines	  tend,	  as	  yet,	  to	  be	  pretty	  crude,	  but	  most	  make	  use	  of	  one	  or	  both	  of	  two	  mechanisms	  suggested	  by	  Lewis.	  One	  is	  that	  attending	  to	  sceptical	  possibilities	  tends	  to	  drive	  
the	  standards	  up.	  Another	  is	  that	  insofar	  as	  one	  is	  in	  a	  context	  where	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  at	  stake	  as	  to	  whether	  p	  is	  true,	  that	  also	  tends	  to	  drive	  the	  standards	  up.	  Even	  in	  this	  vague	  form	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  how,	  in	  rough	  outlines,	  such	  ideas	  will	  apply	  to	  the	  religious	  case.	  For	  example,	  the	  theist	  might	  contend	  that	  in	  the	  context	  of	  problem	  of	  evil	  discussions,	  the	  atheist’s	  attention	  has	  been	  drawn	  to	  the	  ‘sceptical’	  possibility	  that	  horrendous	  evils	  have	  an	  undetected	  higher	  purpose	  and	  that	  this	  puts	  the	  atheist	  in	  a	  context	  where	  he	  cannot	  claim	  ‘If	  there	  were	  a	  good	  guy	  who	  could	  have	  prevented	  this,	  he	  would’.	  Meanwhile,	  many	  religious	  questions	  (though	  certainly	  not	  all	  theological	  nuances)	  are	  paradigmatically	  ‘high	  stakes’	  and	  so,	  assuming	  the	  second	  mechanism,	  one	  would	  expect	  the	  standards	  for	  ‘know’	  to	  be	  high	  in	  contexts	  where	  those	  questions	  are	  explicitly	  under	  consideration.	  For	  better	  or	  worse,	  however,	  we	  feel	  these	  mechanisms	  need	  fuller	  development	  in	  order	  for	  their	  application	  to	  religious	  belief	  to	  be	  a	  very	  profitable	  venture.	  (The	  effect	  of	  stakes	  has	  also	  being	  prominent	  in	  discussion	  of	  ‘subject	  sensitive	  invariantism’.	  For	  more	  one	  why	  the	  relevant	  discussion	  of	  stakes	  has	  been	  hopelessly	  underdeveloped	  see	  	  Anderson	  and	  Hawthorne	  MS.)	  	   Many	  discussions	  of	  knowledge	  emphasise	  that	  knowledge	  has	  a	  further	  structural	  feature	  in	  its	  intimately	  connection	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  ‘defeaters’:	  when	  undefeated	  defeaters	  are	  present	  for	  belief	  in	  p,	  knowledge	  of	  p	  is	  unattainable.	  (According	  to	  this	  way	  of	  theorizing,	  one	  cannot	  know	  that	  a	  red	  ball	  is	  in	  fact	  red	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perception	  if	  one	  learns	  that	  the	  ball	  has	  red	  lights	  shining	  on	  it	  and	  would	  as	  a	  result	  look	  red	  even	  if	  it	  were	  white.	  Knowledge	  of	  the	  lighting	  provides	  a	  ‘defeater’	  that	  blocks	  the	  path	  to	  knowledge	  of	  the	  ball’s	  colour	  via	  perception.)	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  religious	  belief,	  numerous	  alleged	  sources	  of	  
defeat	  for	  these	  beliefs	  have	  been	  proposed:	  for	  instance,	  the	  facts	  about	  religious	  pluralism	  discussed	  in	  earlier	  sections	  might	  together	  be	  said	  to	  constitute	  a	  defeater.	  Likewise,	  facts	  about	  the	  distribution	  of	  evil	  in	  the	  world,	  or	  the	  evolutionary	  origins	  of	  religious	  belief	  might	  be	  defeaters.	  This	  way	  of	  speaking	  is	  common	  in	  epistemology,	  and	  any	  discussion	  of	  scepticism	  should	  mention	  it.	  	   We	  think,	  however,	  that	  the	  need	  for	  defeat	  as	  an	  additional	  constraint	  on	  knowledge	  is	  not	  obvious.	  Many	  alleged	  cases	  of	  defeat	  can	  be	  assimilated	  under	  headings	  that	  have	  already	  appeared	  in	  our	  discussion.	  Some	  paradigmatic	  cases	  can	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  CLOSE	  WORLDS	  and	  SIMILARITY:	  in	  many	  cases	  where	  I	  learn	  that	  an	  object	  that	  appears	  red	  is	  under	  red	  lighting,	  and	  would	  appear	  red	  even	  if	  it	  wasn’t,	  the	  belief	  that	  it	  is	  red	  has	  a	  bad	  companion:	  either	  it	  is	  either	  actually	  false,	  or	  false	  in	  nearby	  worlds	  where	  it	  is	  formed	  by	  a	  relevantly	  similar	  perceptual	  process.	  Hence	  we	  already	  have	  laid	  out	  the	  resources	  for	  explaining	  why	  one	  can’t	  know	  in	  these	  cases.	  In	  other	  cases	  there	  is	  a	  pretty	  good	  case	  to	  be	  made	  that	  knowledge	  is	  present	  before	  and	  after	  the	  so-­‐called	  defeater.	  The	  alleged	  defeater	  may	  merely	  make	  it	  harder	  to	  know	  that	  one	  knows	  or	  instead	  reveal	  one	  to	  be	  someone	  who	  would	  cling	  on	  to	  the	  belief	  in	  a	  setting	  where	  one	  didn’t	  know	  and	  in	  that	  sense	  to	  reveal	  that	  one	  has	  dicey	  dispositions.	  Of	  course	  friends	  of	  defeat	  will	  want	  to	  say	  more	  than	  this,	  but	  in	  our	  view	  current	  accounts	  of	  defeat	  are	  so	  gerrymandered	  or	  impoverished	  that	  we	  cannot	  apply	  them	  usefully	  to	  the	  religious	  case.	  	  We	  have	  articulated	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  pessimism	  about	  the	  fruits	  of	  two	  candidate	  structural	  features	  of	  knowledge	  –	  context	  dependence	  and	  defeat.	  At	  any	  rate,	  we	  are	  not	  in	  a	  position	  make	  helpful	  contributions	  to	  the	  epistemology	  
of	  theology	  by	  drawing	  on	  structural	  insights	  of	  that	  sort.	  That	  said	  we	  await	  new	  and	  more	  nuanced	  theoretical	  models	  of	  those	  phenomena	  and	  also	  those	  that	  we	  have	  discussed	  earlier.	  Discussions	  of	  scepticism	  come	  to	  life	  when	  conducted	  within	  the	  contexts	  of	  such	  models	  and	  will	  likely	  languish	  if	  they	  content	  themselves	  with	  a	  methodology	  dominated	  by	  reliance	  on	  intuitions	  about	  cases.	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